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A Ransom Note from the
Opposition to the Proposed Rules
of Ethics for Legal Commentators

by Raymond M. Brown*
Hijack the question!
That is a soupqon of tactical knowledge that every lawyer sojourning
on the TV frontier absorbs quickly. In the fast-paced realm of the
electronic media, there are limited opportunities to speak. To be
effective you must disregard the dictates of politeness ingested at your
mother's knee, ignore the question presented, and make your point
succinctly. To wit:
Question: Do you think Bill Clinton should be impeached?
Answer:
I think the abuse of power by Ken Starr doomed the Office
of Independent Counsel and set a dangerous example for a whole
generation of prosecutors.
Because the proponents of ethical rules for commentators are bringing
their considerable skills to bear on the wrong problem, we must "hijack"
the commentator-ethics question and refocus the discussion. We should
abandon further development of a code of ethics for commentators' and
instead address the more pressing problem of the lack of ethical and
strategic understanding demonstrated by lawyers dealing with the media
on behalf of clients. It is distressingly common for lawyers to misunderstand that talking to a reporter may serve the lawyer's interest at the
* Court TV Anchor and host of On Appeal (1996-present). Host of the New Jersey
Network's two-time Emmy Award winning program "Due Process" (1995-present).
Graduate of Columbia University (1969) and Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley (1994). Partner in the firm of Brown & Brown, Newark, New
Jersey. Member, New Jersey Bar and New York Bar. Fellow of the American College of
Trial Lawyers.
1. I distinguish a codification from a discussion of appropriate conduct for commentators. The dialogue fostered by Professors Levenson, Chemerinsky, and Scheck has been,
and will continue to be, extremely valuable.
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expense of the client. An unpaid media appearance is the best
"advertising" a lawyer can have. On the other hand, many clients,
particularly in criminal cases, are ill-served by extensive public
comments by counsel.
When there is strategic and ethical justification for using the media,
lawyers often fail to do so effectively. Many have been slow to learn that
the lawyer who is not yet prepared to give an opening statement is
similarly not ready to talk in detail to the press. To make matters
worse, this tendency to make ill-advised extrajudicial statements is
gaining currency at a time when sound guidance on the standards
governing such statements is in short supply because of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada2 and the ABA's
responsive 1994 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules").3
The level of awareness and skill demonstrated by otherwise competent
lawyers in dealing with the media is so disturbingly low that our current
mantra should be "just say no" to talking to the press.4 As long as this
state of affairs exists, our first priority should be to address the problem
of lawyers as advocates who respond unethically or inartfully to the
media.
In drafting this note, I resorted to hijacking the commentator-ethics
question to emphasize the dangers of complicating the ethical universe
with a new, unenforceable, free-floating set of rules aimed in many cases
at lawyers who haven't troubled to understand the old ones. It is more
important, more logical, and more consistent with the traditions of bar
regulations to begin to alter the media-related conduct of lawyers
"participating" in litigation than to attack the relatively new and more
diffuse problems posed by lawyers as commentators.5

2. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.6, 3.8 (1994). In response to
Gentile, the Model Rules were amended in 1994 to create a new "safe harbor." Rule 3.6(c)
now permits a lawyer to make an extrajudicial statement "to protect a client from the
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the
lawyer's client." This amendment was appropriate because of experiences like Gentile, in
which a lawyer might be required to fight back on his client's behalf. However, it created
new areas of uncertainty concerning when such conduct should be permitted and whether
a statement of a lawyer acting under 3.6(c) was "limited to such information as is necessary
to mitigate the recent adverse publicity." Id.
4. My colleague, Wanda M. Akin, and I have entitled our lecture on this subject "Just
Say No-Then Use the Media Before It Uses You!"
5. This struggle over the question of priorities in the realm of ethics caused me to stray
close to the boundaries of proper debate by committing a hijacking. Curiously, it is only
in this same area that the professors stray from the Marquis of Queensbury Rules.
Claiming that their "critics" want to resolve all other "ills" and "pressing problems" of the
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This brings us to one of the primary barriers to the construction of a
workable commentator code. How can we determine who is a "participant"' bound by traditional bar regulations and who is a commentator
within the ambit of a proposed new code? Despite the professors'
assertion that there is a "profound difference in the role of commentator
and participant,"7 there are great obstacles to determining who is who.
The ABA's 1994 amendments did more than create a new "safe harbor."
They began a process of redefining a participant (It is safe to assume
that we would want clarity on the question of whose conduct was
governed by traditional rules, rather than the commentator code).
Professor Lawrence Hellman, who drafted a revision of Model Rule 3.6
for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, argues that a literal interpretation of
the ABA's version of 3.6(a) would subject lawyers serving as "news
analysts and commentators" to the strictures of the Model Rules.8
A New York trial court, ruling in the media-intense trial of Joey
Buttafuoco,9 added another layer to the "commentator/participant"
analysis. The court banned extrajudicial statements by the lawyer
representing Buttafuoco's wife, Mary Jo, during Buttafuoco's trial.1"

legal system before turning to those presented by legal commentary, they have violated the
prohibition against "straw men." Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of
Being a Commentator III, 50 MERCER L. REV. 737 (1999). In fact, the problem of
irresponsible media conduct by commentators is a "lesser included" aspect of the same
misconduct by lawyers engaged in representation of clients (The rules governing the
modern sport of boxing are patterned after those formulated in 1867 by the 8th Marquis
of Queensbury).
6. Model Rule 3.6(a) would extend the prohibitions on extrajudicial statements to any
lawyer who "is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
matter." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
7. Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5, at 752.
8. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Attorneys'
Trial Publicity: Realism and Aspiration, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1998).
Rule 3.6(a) presently applies to any lawyer, regardless of whether the lawyer is
participating in the matter in question. Literally, then, a lawyer serving as a news
analyst or commentator could be disciplined under the present rule. This broad
reach of the rule significantly curtails the First Amendment freedom of all lawyers
as well as the public's access to relevant and helpful information. The 1994 ABA
amendment suggests that such a broad sweep extends too far. The language
proposed here which restricts the applicability of the Rule to lawyers participating
in the relevant matter (and, through proposed Rule 3.6(c), to lawyers associated
with participating lawyers) is taken verbatim from the ABA's approved 1994
amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. People v. Buttafuoco, 599 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993).
10. Id. at 424-25. New York includes the phrase "associated with" in its equivalent of
Model Rule 3.6(a) and Disciplinary Rule 7-107. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 1200.38 (1998).

770

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Mary Jo was not a defendant in her husband's case and had been a
victim with respect to the earlier attempted murder trial of her
husband's erstwhile paramour, Amy Fisher.1' In effect, a lawyer, two
layers removed from a trial, was found to be a "participant" and bound
by the rules against public comment.
Of course, difficulties in interpretation or draftsmanship should not,
by themselves, defeat an effort to draft a new code. However, the
problems touched on in this note and at the symposium are symptomatic
of the fact that the code proposed by the professors seeks to regulate
political or esthetic judgments that should not be covered in any code of
ethics and seeks to govern conduct that is already adequately addressed
by existing legal and journalistic standards.
This brings to the fore interesting questions of taste, politics, and
esthetics. I suspect that if I viewed hours of legal commentary in the
professors' living rooms, we would all cringe at the same times,
particularly when lawyers engaged in excessive predictions of trial
outcomes.
However, I cannot agree that the lawyer foolish enough to "score" or
"predict" outcomes of trials, rulings, or deliberations has violated an
ethical norm. He or she is taking a risk which, in the universe of free
and open debate, may subject him or her to justifiable ridicule when the
inevitable poor scores mount up. However foolish, such crystal ball
gazing should not be formally proscribed.
During the symposium, Barry Scheck offered the piquant observation
that I supported his guidelines as a member of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"). This support materialized
after months of discussion had caused the proposed NACDL principles
to evolve from a proposed ethics code to a statement of principles to
guide members in their public comments. Professors Chemerinksy and
Levenson are critical of the fact that Principle 2 urges members serving
as commentators to focus on the rights of the criminal accused. 12 This
exhortation reflects the organization's raison d'etre. It presents an open
policy recommendation that would be out of place in a real code of ethics
but is proper in this NACDL document.
These political and esthetic differences suggest that the code proposed
by the professors wanders too often into areas of content regulation.
While everyone knows the proponents of this code are well-motivated,
the concerns expressed at the symposium about its possible use to
suppress unpopular and unorthodox thoughts are ripened by an analysis
of its political and esthetic component.

11.
12.

599 N.Y.S.2d at 420. Fisher's trial ended with a guilty plea to assault. Id.
Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5, at 753-54.
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The only conceivable justification for creating this Trojan Horse-like
code would be to combat evils that cannot otherwise be cured. However,
the areas of concern raised by the proponents are adequately addressed
elsewhere. When client confidences are not preserved, when conflicts of
interest are not disclosed, and when minimum standards of competence
are not maintained, the problem we face is not solved by drafting new
rules, but by enforcing old ones.
Competence and the problem of violations of client confidences are
adequately addressed by both the Model Rules and the Model Code,13
when it still governs. Again, the problem, like the wholesale violations
of O.J. Simpson's privilege by Robert Kardashian in providing assistance
to Lawrence Schiller,14 is a lack of enforcement.
Standards governing the resolution of "conflicts of interest" have long
existed in both the legal and journalistic communities. The preferred
solution in both of these universes is disclosure. There may be problems
of "enforcement," but the norms are absolutely clear.
I share the frustration of the professors on the question of competence.
I certainly empathize with Barry Scheck who, during the Simpson trial,
was often the target of criticism by commentators who could only find
the courthouse by being arrested. Having tried criminal cases for more
than twenty-five years, I was frequently annoyed to witness or even
argue with "lawyers" I knew had little experience. This is particularly
true when the questions under discussion focus on trial tactics and
performance. Again, however, I cannot imagine a journalist who would
not claim to be interested in consulting the most competent lawyer
available. Additionally, the rest of us must be willing to enter the lists
and openly challenge those who speak from an abundance of ignorance
rather than knowledge.
The professors have provided a valuable service by persuading the
legal community to think more precisely about how it should behave
when commenting publicly on the law. They have performed a similar
service for serious legal journalists (much of the rest of the media
wouldn't recognize a serious thought unless it had high Nielsen ratings).
The debate they have inspired should continue, but in the form of open
discourse and not a formal code of ethics for legal commentators.

13.
14.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992).
LAWRENCE SCHILLER & JAMES WILLWERTH, AMERICAN TRAGEDY: THE UNCENSORED

STORY OF THE SIMPSON DEFENSE (1996). The volume is filled with confidential material
and information supplied by Kardashian to Schiller after the criminal trial but before
Simpson's civil trial (Barry Scheck commented on this problem during the symposium).
As far as I know, Kardashian, a member of the defense team, has not been disciplined for
his conduct.

